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ABSTRACT: Embracing an all-hazard view to deal with random failures, natural disasters, accidents and
malevolent intentional acts, a framework for the vulnerability analysis of safety-critical systems and infras-
tructures is set up. A hierarchical structure is used to organise the information on the hazards, which is then
manipulated through a decision-making process for vulnerability evaluation. We present the framework and its
hierarchical model by way of assessing the susceptibility of a safety-critical system to intentional hazards, con-
sidering criteria of diverse nature, such as physical characteristics, social criticality characteristics, exposition
to cascading failures, resilience. We use a ranking method to compare systems of different characteristics. The
systematic process of analysis is presented with reference to the exemplary case of nuclear power plants.
1 INTRODUCTION
The vulnerability of safety-critical systems and in-
frastructures is of great concern, given the multiple
and diverse hazards that they are exposed to and the
potential large-scale consequences.
We conceptualise vulnerability as a global system
property related to the system susceptibility to all haz-
ards, intentional, random internal and natural, and to
resilience. Notably, resilience should not be consid-
ered separately but for its effects on the susceptibility
to the three different kinds of hazards.
The susceptibility associated with random inter-
nal hazards and natural hazards is classically treated
within a probabilistic framework to handle both the
aleatory uncertainty in the occurrence of the accident
events and their consequences (Kro¨ger & Zio 2011)
and the epistemic uncertainty on the hypotheses and
parameters of the models used. Intentional hazards re-
late to malevolent acts and lack of a well-established
methodology for accounting for uncertainty due to
behaviours of different rationality (Depoy & Phelan
2005).
In this paper, we illustrate a decision-making
framework intended to guide analysts, managers
and stakeholders in the systematic identification of
sources of vulnerability. Guided by the framework,
effective management can be performed in an all-
hazard perspective addressing questions like: what is
the level of vulnerability of a site comparing with oth-
ers? Which one should be protected and ameliorated?
How to proceed and how much will it cost?
The evaluation through the framework is shown by
way of analysing the susceptibility to intentional
hazards of a safety-critical system, namely a Nu-
clear Power Plant (NPP), considering the vulnerabil-
ity sources and the related features, the system tech-
nical and physical features, and the dependencies and
interdependencies on other systems. The paper is or-
ganised as follows. In Section 2, the framework is pre-
sented with the focus on intentional hazards and by
way of the reference example of NPPs. In Section 3,
the decision-making methodology for assessing sus-
ceptibility is explained. In Section 4, an application
is shown to exemplify the process. Conclusions are
drawn in Section 5.
Table 1: Criteria, subcriteria and preference directions
Criterion Physical characteristics Social criticality Possibility of cascading
failures
Subcriteria Number of workers Percentage of contribution to the welfare Connection distance
Nominal power production Size of served cities
Number of production units
Preference direction Min Min Min
Criterion Recovery means Human preparedness Level of protection
Subcriteria Number of installed backup components Training Physical size of the system
Duration of backup component Safety management Number of accesses
Duration of repair and recovery actions Entrance control
External emergency measures Surveillance
Preference direction Max Max Max
2 FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
Vulnerability is defined in different ways depending
on the domains of application, e.g.: vulnerability is
a measure of possible future harm due to exposure
to a hazard (Kro¨ger & Zio 2011); the identification
of weaknesses in security, focusing on defined threats
that could compromise a system ability to provide a
service (NWRA 2002); the set of conditions and pro-
cesses resulting from physical, social, economic, and
environmental factors, which increase the susceptibil-
ity of a community to the impact of hazards (Hof-
mann, Kjølle, & Gjerde 2012).
With the focus on the susceptibility to intentional
hazards, a four-layers hierarchical model is shown in
Figure 1. The susceptibility to intentional hazards is
characterised in terms of attractiveness and accessi-
bility. These are hierarchically broken down into fac-
tors which influence them, including resilience seen
as pre-attack protection (which influences on accessi-
bility) and post-attack recovery (which influences on
attractiveness). The decomposition is made in 6 cri-
teria which are further decomposed in a layer of ba-
sic subcriteria, for which data and information can be
collected to make their evaluation. The criteria and
subcriteria considered serve as examples and are not
to be considered exhaustive.
In the following subSections, the criteria of the lay-
ers are defined and assigned preference directions for
treatment in the decision-making process. The prefer-
ence direction of a criterion indicates towards which
state it is desirable to lead it to reduce susceptibility,
i.e., it is assigned from the point of view of the de-
fender of an attack who is concerned with protecting
the system. Although only the 6 criteria in the third
level of the hierarchy will be considered in the exem-
plary demonstration on the NPPs evaluation, exam-
ples of scales of evaluation also of the basic subcri-
teria of the last layer are proposed, in relation to the
characteristics of NPPs for exemplification purposes.
2.1 Attractiveness
This second-layer criterion is intended to capture the
interest that terrorists may have to attack the system.
Such interest is considered to be driven mainly by the
effects that the attack can cause, which include dam-
ages to the assets and environment, injured people,
deaths. These depend on the physical characteristics
of the system, its social criticality, the possibility of
cascading effects and the system resilience. In a gen-
eral sense, resilience represents the ability to avoid
the occurrence of accidents despite the persistence of
poor circumstances or to recover from some unex-
pected events (Furniss, Back, & Blandfod 2011). It is
the ability of a system to anticipate, cope with/absorb,
resist and recover from the impact of a hazard (tech-
nical) or a disaster (social). Resilience reflects a dy-
namic confluence of factors that promotes positive
adaptation despite exposure to adverse life experi-
ences. In our model, it is presented in terms of ca-
pacity of recovery, human preparedness and level of
protection.
The preference direction characterising this factor
is such that the more attractive the system is, the more
it should be protected.
2.2 Accessibility
Accessibility is introduced as a criterion in the sec-
ond layer of the hierarchy to describe the degree to
which it is easy or difficult to arrive at a system in
order to intentionally damage it. It is a function of
resilience through the level of protection present to
defend against malevolent attacks.
2.3 Examples of subcriteria
Each third-layer criterion is constituted by several
subcriteria (Table 1). The value of the subcriteria can
be crisp numbers or language terms according to the
contents. Each of the subcriterion is analysed in giv-
Figure 1: Hierarchical modelSusceptibility to intentional hazards
Table 2: Number of workers






ing an explanation of the contribution on the corre-
sponding third-layer criterion.
2.3.1 Number of workers
This criterion can be seen to contribute to the attrac-
tiveness for an attack from various points of view, for
example: 1) the more workers, the more work injuries
and deaths from an attack; 2) the more workers, the
easier for the attackers to sneak into the system; 3) the
more workers, the higher the possibility that one of
them can be turned into an attack. Limiting the num-
ber of workers can then contribute to the security of
the plant and, thus, reduce its attractiveness for an at-
tack. Table 2 reports some reference values, typical of
NPPs.
2.3.2 Entrance control
This gives due count to the process and technology for
entrance control. The more effective the control at the
entrance is, the less easy it is to enter the system with
bad intentions. Table 3 gives a 6 levels presentation.
3 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
The hierarchical model just presented structures the
susceptibility of a critical system to intentional attacks
in terms of a number of criteria. The 16 basic, bottom-
layer subcriteria are organised into 6 main ones: the
Table 3: Entrance control
Level Type of entrance control
1 Completely open, no control, no barriers
2 Unlocked, non-complex barriers
3 Complex barriers, security patrols
4 Secure area
5 Guarded, secure area, alarmed
6 Completely secure
physical characteristics, the social criticality, the pos-
sibility of cascading failures, the recovery means, the
human preparedness and the level of protection. For
the quantitative assessment, each of the 16 basic sub-
criteria needs to be assigned a value function in rela-
tion to the main criterion to which it contributes. The
assignment can be done in relative terms, by compar-
ing different systems with different characteristics. To
exemplify how this is done, we consider NPPs as crit-
ical systems and perform a decision-making process
for the evaluation of their characteristics with respect
to susceptibility to intentional attacks. We first build a
ranking of fictitious NPPs, through the authors’ sub-
jective preferential judgment of indirect data. This
serves for constructing the basis for the relative eval-
uation of the characteristics of real NPPs.
To carry out the decision-making process for the
evaluation, we resort to a multiple criteria decision aid
(MCDA) technique named ACUTA (Analytic Centre
UTilite´ Additive) based on the computation of the an-
alytic centre of a polyhedron for the selection of addi-
tive value functions that are compatible with holistic
assessments of the preferences in the criteria (Bous,
Fortemps, Glineur, & Pirlot 2010). Being central by
definition and uniquely defined, the analytic centre
benefits from theoretical advantages over the notion
of centrality used in other meta-UTA methods. A brief
explanation of the method is given in the subSections
that follow.
For the practical computations, we use an im-
plementation of the method available in the Open
Source software Diviz of the Decision Deck Project
(http://www.decision deck.org/ ).
3.1 Analytic Center
The idea of the analytic centre of a polyhedron was
first introduced by Huard (1967) and later reintro-
duced by Sonnevend (1985) in the context of con-
vex optimization techniques. The theoretical frame-
work around this concept lies at the heart of interior-
point methods for solving linear programming op-
timisation problems. In ACUTA, it is suggested to
compute a unique, well-defined and central solution
for aggregation-disaggregation methods based on ad-
ditive piecewise linear value function models (Bous,
Fortemps, Glineur, & Pirlot 2010).
3.2 ACUTA
The UTA( UTilite´ Additive) method consists in build-
ing a piecewise linear additive decision model from
a preference structure using linear programming. Let
A be the set of possible alternatives and AL =
{aj, j = 1, ..., k} the learning set. In AL, alternatives
are ranked in order of decreasing preference by the
DM (Decision Maker), i.e. aj % aj+1, j = 1, ..., k− 1,
where % expresses that aj is either preferred () or
indifferent (∼) to aj+1. The values of the n criteria,
denoted by xi(i = 1, ..., n) , belong to the interval
[χi, χi] that, for each i, corresponds to the range be-
tween the worst (χi) and best χi values found for at-
tribute i among the alternatives inA. Our purpose is to
establish marginal value functions νi(χi) for each cri-
terion in order to model the perceived value of each
alternative. Since these values are piecewise linear
functions, the range of values on each criterion is di-
vided into subintervals using a predefined number of
ai points such that χi = {χi = χ1i , χ2i , ..., χaii = χi} .
The subdivision makes it possible to compute value
functions by linear interpolation between the values
νi(χ
l
i) that have to be estimated and hence appear as
variables in the linear program. Using the degrees of
freedom in the definition of a value function, we set
νi(χi) = 0 and
n∑
i=1
νi(χi) = 1 (1)
This implies that νi(χi) can be interpreted as
the tradeoff associated to criterion i. Furthermore,
all value functions should be monotonic, that is
νi(χ
l+1
i )− νi(χli) > λ(∀ i and l = 1, ..., ai = 1) , with
λ > 0. According to the additive model, the global
value ν(aj) of an alternative aj is given by the sum
of its marginal values. In other terms, if the value of
the jth alternative on attribute i is denoted by aij , the





This analytic expression of an alternative’s global
value allows for modelling the preferences of the DM,
as expressed in the ranking of the learning set, using
the following linear constraints, which we call prefer-
ence constraints:
ν(aj)− ν(aj+1) > δ if aj  aj+1, (3)
ν(aj)− ν(aj+1) = 0 if aj ∼ aj+1. (4)
Here, λ is a positive number, called preference thresh-
old, which is usually set to a small value. The assess-
ment of the νi(χli) variables should be done in such a
way that the deviation from the preferences expressed
by the DM in the subset AL is minimal. The adapta-
tion of the linear additive aggregation-disaggregation
model to the analytic centre formulation is quite
straightforward and gives rise to the ACUTA method;
the introduction of slack variables into the objective
function leads to the following nonlinear optimisation











s.t. ν(aj)− ν(aj+1) = 0 if aj ∼ aj+1, (6)
(ν(aj)− ν(aj + 1))− δ = sj if aj  aj+1, (7)
sil = (ν(χ
l+1
i )− ν(χli))− λ, (8)
n∑
i=1
νi(χi) = 1. (9)
Since this approach maximises the sum of slacks, pa-
rameters δ and λ can be omitted, and this is consid-
ered an advantage. The essential advantage of this
method, however, is the centrality and uniqueness of
the solutions it produces.
3.3 The Diviz tool
Diviz is a software for designing, executing and shar-
ing Multicriteria Decision Aid (MCDA) methods, al-
gorithms and experiments. Based on basic algorith-
mic components, Diviz allows combining these crite-
ria for creating complex MCDA workflows and meth-
ods.
Once the workflow is designed, it can be executed
on various data sets written according to the XM-
CDA standard. This execution is performed on dis-
tant servers via web services (http://www.decision
deck.org/diviz/ ).
Figure 2: ACUTA analysis workflow for the illustrative example of Section 4
Once the execution is completed, the outputs of
the different elementary components are available and
can be visualised in Diviz.
Figure 2 shows the workflow of the analysis of sus-
ceptibility to intentional hazards for the illustrative
example on NPPs of Section 4. This workflow uses,
among other components, the ACUTA component to
determine value functions based on the ranking of the
NPPs given by the authors. These value functions are
then applied to the real plants values and the whole
data is then analysed via some graphical representa-
tions.
4 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
For illustration purposes, 9 fictitious plants are con-
sidered to obtain the value functions, which are in
turn used to evaluate the susceptibility to intentional
attacks of 9 real plants. In simple words, the former 9
fictitious plants are evaluated with respect to their sus-
ceptibility to intentional hazards, to build the base for
comparison of the latter. Best (least vulnerable) and
worst (most vulnerable) fictitious plants are defined
as bounding references, by taking the best/worst con-
ditions of all subcriteria considered. The details are
presented in the following subSections.
4.1 Case study preparation
In the hierarchical model of susceptibility, we con-
sider 16 basic subcriteria and 6 main criteria.
4.1.1 Data preparation
In order to apply the ACUTA method, a data prepara-
tion is necessary.
For the 9 fictitious plants (named F1 to F9), the data
of the 16 subcriteria are assigned arbitrarily by the au-
thors. The data of one basic subcriterion are assigned
to the different fictitious sites in a way to ensure that
all possible values of the subcriterion are included.
The worst (named fictitiousWorst) and best (named
fictitousBest) fictitious plants are defined by taking
the worst/best values of each basic subcriterion. These
two fictitious plants bound, in worst and best, the sit-
uations that are expected from the other plants.
Then, the descriptive terms and values of the 16
subcriteria are scaled onto the categories.
To illustrate the procedure of comparison of the
subcriteria, we refer to the level of the six aggre-
gated main criteria introduced in Section 2 and listed
in Table 1. Their preference directions are also pre-
sented. They convey the fact that it is preferable to
limit the dimension of the plant, minimise social crit-
icality, control the cascading failure, maximise the re-
covery means, give more training, be better prepared
for emergency and take more protection measures.
To get the values of the six aggregated criteria, we
apply a simple weighted sum to their constituents sub-
criteria. For this, the weights for each subcriterion are
arbitrarily assigned by the authors. Then, the data of
the 9 fictitious NPPs are normalised (that is, rescaled
between 0 and 1).
Same steps are applied to the 9 real NPPs (named
R1 to R9), whose data have been taken from publicly
available documents.
The weights of each basic subcriterion in the group
for the main criteria are the same as for the fictitious
NPPs.
4.1.2 Ranking of fictitious NPPs
As presented in the previous Sections, the analysis
using ACUTA method needs a ranking of the ficti-
tious NPPs to begin with. It is usually given by the
experts. In our case study, the utility functions are
first given by the authors. As presented in Section
3.2, let N be the set of the 9 fictitious plants and
NL = {Fj, j = 1, ...,9} the learning set. The data of
fictitiousWorst and fictitiousBest are used to be the
limit interval for the given criterion, divided into 5
subintervals. The utility functions are given such that
all the data of fictitiousWorst are set to 0 and the data
Figure 3: Utility functions given by authors
Table 4: Ranking of the fictitious NPPs based on the utility func-













sum of the fictitiousBest is set to 1. The value func-
tions can be calculated and visualised in Figure 3.
Based on the utility functions of the main criteria
and the data, we can obtain the marginal value of the
corresponding criterion for each fictitious NPP.
As a characteristic of the additive model, the global
values which represent the susceptibility of the NPPs
to the intentional hazards are given by the sum of
its marginal values. These values are used to rank
the NPPs. The ranking obtained is integrated into
the decision-making process in the following subSec-
tion, to find out the value functions for the 6 criteria
through the ACUTA method. The intentional hazards
of real plants is then analysed and represented by us-
ing Diviz.
Figure 4: Representation of the Value Functions
4.2 Results
Applying the ACUTA method on the 9 fictitious
plants in Diviz, we can calculate the value functions
of the 6 criteria (Figure 4).
First of all, the criteria preference directions can
be recognised easily from the trends of the curves.
Also, for most part of each curve, it is natural that
the vertical axis values are roughly proportional to
the abscissa axis ones, because the vulnerability per-
formance is roughly proportional to the value of the
related parameters. More importantly, we can figure
out the sensitive interval of each criterion. For exam-
ple, for criterion 4, Recovery means, in the interval
from 0.7 to 0.8 of the abscissa axis, there is an obvi-
ous change of gradient that is larger than before. This
phenomenon also occurs in intervals of the other cri-
teria and is due to the authors’ preferences in the judg-
ments. The more recovery means, the less susceptible
the NPPs are to intentional hazards. Especially after a
certain level (0.7 of the abscissa axis value), the extra-
added measure can substantially increase the protec-
tion. This can be an indicator to know better the pref-
erence of the DMs during the ranking step and can
also serve as a guidance during the amelioration of
the plants.
In using the value functions, the former data of the
9 real NPPs can then be taken into account. We can
compare the NPPs by single criterion. As shown in
the 6 histograms (Figure 5), for one criterion, each
column represents the corresponding performance of
a given NPP. The length of each column is propor-
tional to the marginal values. The longer the column,
the better performance it has for the criterion. In the
solid line frame there are the representative columns
for each criterion of the real plants.
For the 6 criteria, the performances of most of
the real NPPs are at least as good as the fictitious
ones. Especially for possibility of cascading failure
and level of protection, the performances of the real
Figure 6: Histogram of susceptibility to intentional hazards of the NPPs
Figure 5: Histograms of subcriteria of the NPPs
ones are nearly the best among all these 20 NPPs. But
for the physical characteristics of the system, there
are 3 plants that are worse than the others because of
their higher production power and bigger size. For hu-
man preparedness, because of certain enhanced train-
ing and safety management systems, there are 3 plants
that present a better result. For recovery means, the
differences among the NPPs are not very big. And for
the social criticality, they are more vulnerable than the
fictitious ones.
As a characteristic of the additive model, the global
values which represent the susceptibility of the NPPs
to the intentional hazards are given by the sum of the
marginal values. An overview of the 20 NPPs is pre-
sented graphically in Figure 6. Each column repre-
sents the susceptibility performance of one NPP to
intentional hazards. Each column is constituted by
6 blocks with different textures that represent the 6
main criteria. As mentioned before, the height of each
block of the representative column is proportional to
the value of the corresponding criterion data. The
smaller the height of the representative column of a
plant is, the more susceptible it is in facing an inten-
tional hazard.
Based on the performance values, we put the 20
Figure 7: Ranking of the 20 NPPs
Figure 8: Ranking of the Real NPPs
NPPs in order as shown in Figure 7.
For the 9 real NPPs, according to the ranking, there
are 5 that are among the first 10; all of them are among
the first 15. Most of their performances are better than
the fictitious ones. This is reasonable because for cer-
tain basic subcriteria, we have given some abnormally
low values to the fictitious NPPs (e.g. for the basic
subcriterion Type of entrance control, we have set cer-
tain fictitious plants to have unlocked barriers which
is impossible for a real NPP). For the real NPPs, in
view of production safety and international standards,
certain criteria are already forced to be in limited in-
tervals, that leads to improved situations than for the
fictitious ones. We then concentrate only on the real
NPPs, whose ranking result is given in Figure 8.
In order to find out the weaknesses of the real
NPPs, we have done first the comparison between the
Figure 9: Performance comparison of the Real NPPs
fictitiousBest and R1 (which is the best among all the
Real NPPs) and then between R1 and the rest of the
Real NPPs, separately. The difference of the marginal
value of each criterion is shown in Figure 9.
R1 is as good as the fictitiousBest for two criteria.
In comparing with the rest of the Real NPPs, for R2,
R5, R7 and R8, R1 is at least as good as them for each
of the criteria. But for R3, R4, R6 and R9, R1 has an
advantage only on the sum of the differences. There
are criteria for which R1 is not as good as the others.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a decision making framework
for analysing the vulnerability of critical infrastruc-
tures. A hierarchical model of susceptibility to inten-
tional attacks has been taken as reference example. A
case study of NPPs has been analysed by using the
ACUTA method and the results calculated with the
software Diviz.
The main contributions of this paper are the estab-
lishment of the hierarchical modelling framework for
system vulnerability analysis and the decision making
setting for its evaluation.
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